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Abstract 
Firms can be credit constrained either because a loan has been denied by the lender or because 
they decide not to apply for such a loan due to expected rejection. Using a large sample of 
European small and medium enterprises, we investigate the relationship between gender and 
credit constraints. Although no evidence is found that financial institutions are biased against 
female managers, female-run firms are less likely to file a loan application, as they anticipate 
being rejected. As a consequence, firms managed by women obtain less bank financing.  
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1. Introduction 
When Eliza Lucas Pinkney took over the management of a plantation from her father in 
1738 at 16 years of age, she was not aware she would eventually be listed among the first and most 
legendary female entrepreneurs. Indeed, her success in introducing the cultivation of the indigo 
plant in South Carolina, which was in demand for its dye in the growing textile market, granted 
her a place in history (Mueller, 2012). Stories like hers substantiate the important role women can 
play in business and consequently the importance of reducing constraining barriers in order to give 
them the opportunity to fully utilize their managerial skills. Thus, it comes as no surprise that 
governments all around the world have progressively adopted regulations limiting potential gender 
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inequalities, such as equal pay and equal opportunity legislation or quotas to promote women’s 
political representation (Blau and Kahn, 2001; Bush, 2011). However, despite these regulatory 
efforts and numerous success stories, women still struggle to reach the higher echelons of power 
and are a minority in national legislatures and corporate boards of directors (Bush, 2011; 
Grosvold, 2011). Furthermore, they are confronted with glass ceilings in their career progression 
and a gender pay gap that seems to persist globally (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Hausmann et al., 
2008). In fact, attitudes towards these issues vary across different countries depending on their 
cultural and economic heritage (Alesina et al., 2013).  
Earlier studies have investigated whether gender-related prejudice exists in the credit 
market but failed to reach a consensus. Research that relies on US data claims that, after 
controlling for a range of relevant factors, women who operate small businesses do not face 
discrimination (Blanchflower et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 
2002). The denial rates, however, seem to show a significant discrepancy across different races, 
with African-Americans being particularly disadvantaged (Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005). Data 
from Trinidad and Tobago used by Storey (2004) corroborates the conclusion that female-owned 
businesses are not hindered in the credit market. On the other end of the spectrum, Muravyev et al. 
(2009), who use data from European and Asian countries, find evidence consistent with 
discrimination of female entrepreneurs by financial institutions. Even more surprisingly, Raturi 
and Swamy (1999) report that in Zimbabwe the probability of receiving a business loan 
conditional on applying is ceteris paribus lower for men.  
Our work endeavors to contribute to the debate on potential gender bias by assessing 
whether firms led by female managers are constrained in accessing credit. We rely on a large 
survey of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) assessing their access to finance in the euro area, 
which was conducted by the European Central Bank (SAFE dataset). To the best of our 
knowledge, this data has not yet been employed to investigate gender-related aspects of credit 
constraints. The database we utilize is unique in that it provides information on whether firms have 
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been provided with credit by banks and also identifies ‘discouraged borrowers’, defined as those 
who would like to get a loan, but decide not to apply due to the fact that they anticipate rejection. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one prior study that explicitly modeled discouraged 
borrowers (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). Their study used the US National Survey of Small Business 
Finances and concluded that application avoidance does not differ significantly by gender.  
Our results confirm that financial institutions are not biased against women managers when 
considering the loan applications of their companies, as the likelihood of being successful is 
independent of gender. This holds true regardless of the concentration of the banking industry in a 
given country. Apparently banks allocate funds according to the creditworthiness of a firm and the 
increased use of figures-based credit scoring and credit rating tools may have contributed to 
constraining gender discrimination. More interestingly, female-run firms tend to apply less often, 
as they seem to be less confident of a positive outcome. This result regarding discouraged 
borrowers is at variance with those of Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), who examined the behavior of US 
entrepreneurs in the 1990s. Our findings have tangible implications for female managers, banks in 
general and their marketing strategies in particular. They are also subject to the caveat that, due to 
the limitations of our dataset, we are able to construct only very basic controls for credit risk. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section considers different viewpoints on credit 
access and discrimination. Against this background, we develop a number of testable hypotheses 
in section 3. Section 4 provides details on the dataset used, methodology and variable construction. 
The following section engages in a discussion of the summary statistics. Subsequently, we proceed 
to report the regression results, interpret our findings and consider a battery of robustness checks. 
The paper closes with concluding remarks and recommendations.  
2. Credit Access and Gender  
SMEs are often constrained in accessing supplementary equity from their existing owners, 
who usually invest a substantial part of their wealth in the venture from its very establishment 
(Avery et al., 1998). Even if SMEs can turn to alternative providers of equity, such as business 
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angels or venture capitalists, new shareholders typically face big agency problems linked to the 
opaqueness that characterizes SMEs (Landström, 1992). In addition, entrepreneurs do not like the 
implementation of additional control and management tools, the reduction of freedom in managing 
the firm and limits on access to non-pecuniary benefits, all of which can materialize with the 
emergence of new shareholders (Delmar, 2000). Previous research stresses that SMEs can use 
other sources of finance, such as leasing and factoring (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006) or exploit 
bootstrap finance (Wingborg and Landström, 2000). Nevertheless, since the aforementioned 
sources often cannot cover all of their financing needs, SMEs turn to banks. 
Diamond (1984) models banks as delegated monitors. Since savers do not have the skills, 
competences and resources to evaluate the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, they delegate 
this activity to banks. Indeed, a bank’s lending decision is based on collecting information about 
the customer in order to evaluate them and their creditworthiness. The greater the ability to 
accurately perform such evaluations, the greater the mitigation of risks and the better the bank’s 
performance in terms of long-term profit (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Fredriksson and Moro, 2014; 
Rasiah, 2010).  
2.1 What Affects Access to Credit? 
Traditionally, literature on lending investigates credit access by looking at the amount of 
credit obtained by a firm and suggests that the time spent on producing and collecting information 
is of key importance. Indeed, the information the bank can access facilitates the identification of 
borrowers that present moral hazard and adverse selection risks (Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Diamond, 1984). Since a longstanding relationship provides banks with a great amount of private 
information and older firms can rely on an established reputation, both the length of the 
relationship and the age of the firm are found to increase the amount of credit provided (Angelini 
et al., 1998; Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Financial institutions are also 
more supportive in providing credit because of the closeness of the relationship (Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2004), pre-existent relationships that are not necessarily linked to previous lending 
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experiences (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000), and the concentration of the financial system 
(Beck et al., 2006). Moreover, since the value of private information increases when it has been 
gathered by one bank or very few banks, borrowing from multiple sources can reduce the amount 
of credit a financial intermediary is happy to loan. The precision of the information provided is 
also found to play a crucial role in lending decisions - the higher the information quality, the easier 
it is for the bank to evaluate the riskiness of the firm and grant credit (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; 
Elsas, 2005; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001; Moro et al., 2015) 
Research suggests that lending activity is quite peculiar and that not all borrowers will find 
the financing they require. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out that it may not be sensible for banks 
to raise interest rates in order to cope with additional risk, since higher interest rates attract riskier 
projects with a relatively lower likelihood of repayment. Wette's (1983) model suggests that banks 
can use pairs of collateral and interest rates to give to firms the opportunity to self-select. The 
conclusion is that, even in a situation of market equilibrium, some firms will have unmet credit 
needs.  
2.2 Gender Discrimination and Credit Access 
The literature distinguishes between two types of discrimination, namely prejudicial and 
statistical. Statistical discrimination occurs in situations characterized by imperfect information, 
where data on important indicators, such as true productivity or creditworthiness, is difficult and 
costly to obtain directly. In pursuit of cost-savings, a financial institution may be tempted to infer 
this data from easily observable demographic characteristics of individuals (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 
1972). The evaluations will be consequently dependent on the preconceptions of the decision-
maker, however they may not necessarily be motivated by antagonism towards minority groups or 
a particular gender. Instead, their motivation is rooted in economic considerations and, as a 
consequence, statistical discrimination, in contrast to ordinary prejudice, can be used when a bank 
pursues profit-maximization (Muravyev et al., 2009). While this may be the case, Phelps (1972) 
perceptively notes that “discrimination is no less damaging to its victims for being statistical”.  
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Prejudicial forms of discrimination are taste-based and can be defined as lack of adherence 
to objective criteria in formulating judgments on individuals. Becker (1971) carries out pioneering 
research on this issue and considers a wide range of economic ramifications that arise in this 
context. According to his theoretical formulation, those who are biased would be willing to forgo 
potentially profitable market transactions in order to avoid interaction with members of a minority 
group. Competitive pressures existing within the banking sector, however, will act to restrain such 
inefficient behavior. Becker’s argument is based on the critical assumption that banks set the price 
of loans in order to clear the market. Ferguson and Peters (2000) note that whenever credit 
rationing exists within the marginal credit class, financial institutions could engage in some degree 
of prejudicial discrimination without sacrificing any profits. In the presence of rationing, similar 
individuals or companies are, by definition, treated differently, which provides a basis for costless 
discrimination. 
While the issues related to discrimination are complex and multifold, what is of great 
importance to our particular inquiry is whether the gender of the manager is a factor that 
determines credit availability. Empirical findings regarding this issue are far from conclusive. 
Even if Wilson et al. (2007) explain that as long as women are successful in running their business 
no discrimination is in action and Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) suggest that financial 
institutions are not biased against women, evidence of discrimination is found in the work by 
Bellucci et al. (2010). They discover that, on the one hand, female entrepreneurs are more likely to 
be denied credit and, on the other, that female loan managers are more prudent in their lending 
decisions. Interestingly, women are not necessarily discriminated against by men, since female 
loan managers are found to be more likely to deny credit to female entrepreneurs (Saparito et al., 
2013). Moreover, firms with female leadership are found to face different loan contract terms that 
put them at a relative disadvantage (Fabowale et al., 1995). It may be due to the fact that the 
characteristics attributed to successful entrepreneurs are more commonly ascribed to men (Buttner 
and Rosen, 1988). 
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Cavalluzzo et al., (2002) postulated that discriminating financial institutions may increase 
interest rates for groups for which they feel aversion. The interest premium charged would act as 
compensation to the lender for the loss in utility, but it would preclude lending transactions that 
could be potentially profitable at a lower interest rate. However, from the perspective of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and Wette (1983), banks may be reluctant to increase interest rates as this may 
generate a sub-optimal situation of increased risk. Instead, in pursuit of expressing their potential 
biases (should they have any), financial institutions may resort to differential credit rationing 
across groups.  
3. Hypotheses 
Our analysis is based broadly on the framework suggested by Cole (2008) and Cressy 
(2012). The first step a firm takes is to verify whether it needs finance and, if this is indeed the 
case, a decision on whether to apply for a loan will have to be made. Management may seek 
alternative sources of finance (e.g. leasing, trade credit, etc.), or may be discouraged from 
applying, anticipating rejection by the lender. If the firm decides to submit a loan application, it 
will either have its needs satisfied or become an unsuccessful applicant. Gender could potentially 
play a role in all the above-mentioned steps. 
Extant literature suggests various reasons why the borrowing approach may differ across 
genders. Women are found to be more conservative in managing their firms, their enterprises are 
ceteris paribus smaller and face a lower growth rate than firms run by men (Cooper et al., 1988). 
In addition, women perceive themselves as less entrepreneurial and managerial than men (Buttner 
and Rosen, 1988). Consequently, women are expected to be less likely to apply for loans than 
men: 
H1: Female-led enterprises are ceteris paribus less likely to apply for a bank loan than 
male-led ones.  
A managerial decision not to apply for a loan may certainly be made because alternative 
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sources of financing are available or because additional finance is simply not needed. However, it 
can also be linked to the fact that a firm’s management considers the probability of success to be 
very low and thus decides against applying. Such pessimistic expectations can be linked to a lack 
of confidence required to file a loan application, which can be particularly strong among female 
managers. Indeed, the research by Barber and Odean (2001) in the context of the stock market 
documents that men are more confident and, as a result, trade more frequently. Share trading aside, 
women may be also reluctant to apply for loans, as they may erroneously believe that they will be 
discriminated against, even in situations where financial institutions are free of gender-related 
biases. Interestingly, an earlier study by Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) suggests that, on average, women 
in the U.S. do not exhibit greater fear of rejection and therefore should not be labeled ‘discouraged 
borrowers’. At the same time, clear evidence of discrimination is found in the Italian context by 
Bellucci et al. (2010), who find that female entrepreneurs are more likely to be denied credit and 
thus could be more discouraged from applying for a loan. Moreover, firms with female leadership 
also tend to face worse loan contract terms (Fabowale et al., 1995) - an additional reason to be 
discouraged. Thus we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Female-run firms are ceteris paribus more likely to be discouraged from applying for 
a loan due to anticipated rejection.  
Some of the prior research (focused mainly on the US) finds no gender discrimination as 
far as bank activity is concerned (Blanchflower et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; 
Wilson et al., 2007), even if in some cases such findings are affected by the level of bank 
competition in the area. More recent results based on the European context such as the work by 
Bellucci et al. (2010) in Italy, and on broader dataset that includes observations from both 
developed and developing economies (Muravyev et al., 2009) support the notion of gender 
discrimination. These latter results are more recent and derived from a setting more akin to ours, in 
that they also consider the European environment. Thus, we developed the following hypothesis: 
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H3: Female-run firms are ceteris paribus more likely to be denied bank loans.  
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
Our research relies mainly on the Survey of Access to Finance of Enterprise (SAFE) 
conducted on behalf of the European Commission and the European Central Bank. It collects 
information about access to finance by enterprises within the European Union. The SAFE survey 
has been run on a given set of questions every 6 months since 2009 and systematically covers 13 
euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugal and Spain). The questionnaire is translated into the local 
language.  
Firms in the sample are randomly selected from the Dun & Bradstreet. The sample is 
stratified by firm size class, economic activity and country. The number of firms in each stratum of 
the sample is intentionally modified to increase the accuracy of the survey by activity and size 
class. As regards stratification by firm size class, the sample is constructed to offer approximately 
the same precision for micro (1 to 9 employees), small (10 to 49 employees) and medium-sized 
firms (50 to 249 employees). A group of large firms (250 or more employees) is also included. 
The sample sizes for each economic activity are selected to ensure adequate representation across 
the four largest activities: industry, construction, trade and services. The statistical stratification 
takes into account economic activities at the 1-digit level of the European NACE-Nomenclature. 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, financial intermediation, public administration, activities of 
households, extra-territorial organizations, as well as bodies and holding companies are excluded. 
Finally, the sample sizes in different countries are selected on the basis of representation at the 
country level.  
We integrated the data provided by the SAFE dataset with information from the quarterly 
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) run by national central banks on behalf of the European Central 
Bank. The BLS collects information about banks’ lending activity in the previous three months 
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and banks’ propensity to lend in the next six months. The survey provides specific data on banks’ 
propensity to lend to large, small/medium firms and households. We use the data on large and 
small/medium firms in the previous three months as controls for the availability of credit in the 
market. 
We also rely on the Eurostat database for general economic data on GDP growth, 
unemployment rates, and inflation. Herfindhal-Hirschman indices of bank concentration are 
downloaded from ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. Finally, we download data on government 
cash surplus/deficit relative to GDP and on ratio of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans 
in a given country from World Development Indicators published by World Bank. 
4.2 Methodology 
We carry out the analysis in steps in a way similar to Piga and Atzeni (2007) and Guiso 
(1998). Firstly, we examine whether gender affects the decision to apply for a loan (hypothesis 
H1) by using the entire dataset (41,973 observations). In this case, we use the answer to the 
question “Did you apply for a loan during the last period?” and create a dummy indicating whether 
the firm applied for a loan (1) or not (0). Subsequently, we investigate the reason why the firm did 
not apply for a loan by examining the relationship between gender and application self-exclusion 
due to the expectation of being rejected (hypothesis H2). The dummy variable identifies whether 
the firm did not apply because a rejection is anticipated (1) or otherwise (0). In this case we use the 
sub-sample that considers only non-applicants (31,326 observations). Finally, we examine whether 
gender is one of the determinants of success in obtaining credit from a bank (hypothesis H3) by 
using the sub-sample that contains only firms that applied for a loan (10,647). The dummy 
variable we use discriminates between successful (1) and unsuccessful (0) applicants. 
Since all the dependent variables in our regressions are binary, we approach the analysis 
using pooled logit regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Maximum likelihood method is 
used to estimate regression coefficients. We rely on a panel dataset that is unmatched at firm level, 
which prevents us from employing fixed effect panel regression and examining the evolution of 
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lending relationships through time at firm level. We do not apply any non-linear transformations to 
our explanatory variables, as most of our company-specific controls are binary in nature, while the 
macroeconomic aggregates are conventionally untransformed in the extant literature. 
To check the robustness of our findings we carry out additional analysis. We re-test our 
third hypothesis by considering the point raised by Becker (1971). He argues that prejudicial 
discrimination raises a firm’s costs and the existence of competition should be able to mitigate this 
type of discrimination in the long run. In order to examine this claim, we follow use an approach 
similar to that implemented by Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998), namely the original 
specifications used to test H3 are re-estimated by entering the interaction variable between gender 
and market concentration (and simultaneously dropping the market concentration index from the 
controls). In this case, the coefficient of gender continues to capture across-cluster differences that 
can arise once the competition-mitigating effect is taken into consideration. 
In addition, our approach might raise questions about sample selection bias. Thus, we re-
estimate our hypotheses following Heckman (1979) approach. We employ the binary response 
model with sample selection, where the dependent variable indicates whether the firm applies for a 
loan - an approach similar to Piga and Vivarelli (2004). The identification of the selection equation 
requires variable(s) that determine demand for a loan, but are irrelevant in the regressions used to 
test H2 and H3. We identify a good candidate in the variable that measures firms’ need for 
additional finance. Indeed, this variable does not affect the probability that the lender will decide 
to provide finance. 
An additional point that can be raised is that female entrepreneurs may be discouraged 
borrowers because their firms are weaker compared to the men-run ones. Regrettably, the dataset 
we use does not allow for a particularly detailed financial analysis of the companies. To address 
this problem, we performed two separate tests. Firstly, using data from the Bureau van Djik’s 
Orbis, we built a dataset that mirrors SAFE in terms of the proportion of female top managers, 
firms’ turnover class and age, as well as country and industry composition. In this parallel sample, 
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we checked whether, on average, the riskiness of firms varies according to the gender of the top 
manager. This was achieved by examining three available ratios from Altman (1968) Z-score 
suitable for firms that are not listed. Tests were performed on the overall mirror dataset and on 
subsamples at country and at industry level. If creditworthiness does not differ significantly across 
gender, we will be able to rule out the possibility that female managers are discouraged borrowers 
due to inferior characteristics of their firms. Secondly, we use the limited data from SAFE in order 
to construct a raw credit score for the firms included in the SAFE dataset. This is accomplished by 
aggregating the age and firm dimension classes, a dummy that identifies whether the firm belongs 
to a group, and categorical variables capturing the dynamics of turnover and profit. We then re-
estimate our model specifications including this credit risk measure. In doing so, we are able to 
better disentangle the gender effect from the creditworthiness of the firm.  
4.3 Dependent, Independent Variable and Controls 
Our analysis uses three dependent variables from SAFE dataset. The first dummy identifies 
whether a firm applied for a loan, and takes a value of 1 for positive responses and 0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, for those firms that did not apply, SAFE survey asked for a reason behind such a 
decision. Three possible alternatives were given: 1) the firm did not need finance; 2) it did not 
apply due to anticipated rejection; 3) it did not apply for other reasons. Here we create a dummy 
indicating the refusal to apply motivated by the anticipation of rejection. Finally, the applicants 
were asked whether they were successful in obtaining a loan. In this case, our dependent variable 
takes the value of 1 (the firm obtained a loan) or 0 (the bank rejected the application).  
The key independent variable we use is a dummy variable (WOMEN) that identifies the 
gender of the top manager of the firm (owner/director/CEO). It takes a value of 0 for male and 1 
for female managers. The SAFE dataset provides unmatched observations for eight semesters, but 
only seven semesters contain data on gender. Consequently, our analysis excludes the first wave of 
the survey.  
We also consider a set of variables to control for firm characteristics, the moment in time 
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when the data was collected, country and economic context. In terms of firm-specific 
characteristics, the SAFE dataset includes some information about size, since firms are grouped 
into four categories, namely micro, small, medium and large (captured by MICRO, SMALL, 
MEDIUM dummies). Our expectation is that larger firms are more likely to apply for loans due to 
the scale of their operations. In addition, they are less likely to face rejection, since they are 
perceived as more solid, diversified and successful. 
Additionally, the dataset clusters observations according to four age categories: younger 
than two years, between two and five years, between five and nine years, older than nine years. We 
use <2YEARS, 2_5YEARS, and 5_9YEARS dummy variables to identify the age group for each 
observation. Based on previous research (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995), we 
expect older firms to be more likely to submit a loan application and to be successful. We also 
consider whether the firm is independent (INDEPENDENT) or belongs to a group. Independent 
enterprises need more credit since they cannot exploit the financial resources of a parent firm and 
thus lenders can perceive them as weak. 
Turning our attention to the economic performance of enterprises, we use a categorical 
variable (CHANGE_TURNOVER) to identify whether the turnover experienced reduction (-1), 
stability (0) or growth (+1) in the semester considered. The same approach is applied to profit 
(CHANGE_PROFIT). Regrettably, the SAFE dataset does not provide any information about 
monetary value of turnover and profit. According to previous research (Petersen and Rajan 1995; 
Berger et al. 2011), these two controls are expected to be positively related to borrowing decisions 
and inversely related to the likelihood of rejection. We also control for the financial strategy 
pursued by the firm by taking into consideration different sources of finance used during the last 
period. We employ dummies that identify whether the firm used retained profit 
(RETAINED_EARNINGS), trade credit (TRADE_CREDIT), leasing (LEASING), or whether it 
raised additional equity (EQUITY) in the last period. 
In terms of the macroeconomic context in each of the sample countries, we control for the 
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percentage growth in gross domestic product (GDP_GROWTH), inflation rate (INFLATION), 
overall unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT) and the government cash surplus or deficit 
scaled by GDP (CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT). Our models also include a regressor capturing the 
quality of the financial system, which is measured as the percentage of the non-performing loans 
in a given country (NON_PERF). For the first three of the abovementioned variables we use the 
average of the two quarters that belong to the considered semester, while the last two can be 
obtained only with yearly sampling frequency.  
Moreover, we account for the overall financial situation by using the European Central 
Bank’s BLS (Bank Lending Survey) coefficients for small/medium and large firms 
(CREDIT_ACCESS). Since this index is not available for all the countries considered in the 
analysis, we use an average index for the countries with missing data. In fact, this happens only in 
a very limited number of cases and only for smaller nations. Additionally, we consider the 
structure of the financial industry by utilizing the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of bank 
concentration in each country (HHI), since previous research suggests effects of bank competition 
on credit access (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009; Neuberger et al., 2008). Table 1 lists all of the 
variables used in our empirical analysis with their corresponding sources. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset we use contains 41,973 complete original observations from 13 countries 
collected across seven rounds of data collection between second semester 2009 and second 
semester 2012. The summary statistics are reported in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In our sample, 12.35% of firms are run by female managers and 87.65% by males. The 
majority are either micro or small and only 7% are classified as large. Three quarters of the firms 
in the sample are independent and a similar proportion is older than 9 years. All in all, the majority 
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of firms are small, independent and well-established. Only about a third of the enterprises 
exhibited an increase in turnover (35%), while the remainder experienced either stagnation or 
contraction. More than 44% had a reduction in profit, while only 29% enjoyed an increase. These 
statistics can be explained by the fact that observations start in the second half of 2009 and end in 
2012, thus falling within a period of overall economic slowdown. In terms of financing, firms 
appear to use leasing (35% of the sample) and trade credit (36%) quite intensively. Retained 
earnings are used by around 30% of firms. The coefficient measuring the credit made available by 
the banking system (BLS data) is +4.08, which means that, on average, loan availability has 
decreased (positive values of CREDIT_ACCESS are associated with contraction in credit 
provided by the banking system). This datum is in line with the more conservative lending policies 
pursued by the banking system after the 2008 financial crisis and the introduction of the more 
stringent Basel III rules. The gender and the loan application dummies have a highly significant 
Person correlation coefficient of -.0367, suggesting that women are less inclined to apply for bank 
credit. 
Moving from the overall dataset to the sub-sample of firms that did not apply for a loan 
(31,326 observations), the distribution of firm dimension is very similar to that of the overall 
sample. Two thirds of these firms showed a decreasing or stable turnover during the period 
considered and only 28% of them had an increase in profit. In terms of financing, firms relied on 
trade credit and leasing. In the case of the subsample of enterprises that applied for a loan (10,647 
observations), the distribution is slightly different with respect to the overall sample and loan 
application propensity seems to be relatively higher for larger firms. Almost two thirds of these 
firms had an increasing or stable turnover, while more than 47% of them faced a reduction in 
profit. In terms of financing, they tend to rely heavily on leasing and trade credit (44% and 45% 
respectively). The indicator for female top manager is negatively correlated to the credit obtained 
dummy (Person correlation coefficient of -.0050), however this relationship is not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the female dummy is associated strongly and significantly 
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(correlation = +.0232) to the binary variable indicating refusal to apply for a loan due to 
anticipated bank rejection.  
The statistics for the two groups suggest some differences. The subsample of non-
applicants is characterized by a larger proportion of smaller and micro firms compared to the sub-
sample of applicants. This is perfectly logical, since smaller firms typically need less finance and 
are therefore less dependent on bank debt. Interestingly, and somewhat unexpectedly, the two 
groups are very similar in terms of age and profit changes. Firms that file for a loan tend to grow 
in terms of turnover, while the opposite is true for the enterprises that do not seek bank credit. As 
far as gender is concerned, in the sub-sample that considers loan applicants only 10% of the firms 
are managed by women. In the case of firms that did not apply for a loan, this percentage is higher 
and stands at 13%. Although this may suggest that female managers are less likely to apply for a 
loan than their male counterparts, more detailed analysis is needed before arriving at any definite 
conclusion. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Loan Application 
Table 3 presents logit regressions where the dependent variable indicates whether the 
enterprise has applied for a bank loan. Three different specifications are reported. The first 
regression incorporates all controls and semester dummies, the second extends the modeling by 
allowing for country dummies, while the last one is a parsimonious specification excluding 
regressors that are both consistently insignificant and inconsequential for the R-squared. The 
estimations are based on 41,973 observations and correctly classify nearly three quarters of the 
observations. Importantly, the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables are jointly unable to 
explain the underlying process is strongly rejected and the p-values for the corresponding 2 
statistics are indistinguishable from zero. The McFadden’s pseudo R-squared, which is based on 
the likelihood ratio index, varies in our regressions between 5.30% to 6.34%.  This level of the 
explanatory power reflects the fact that the decisions of the entrepreneurs are not purely 
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mechanistic and may be also driven by behavioural factors.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The reported regressions suggest that firms run by female managers are less likely to file a 
loan application, which supports our first hypothesis. This finding is statistically significant at the 
1% level and the odds that a woman will apply are ceteris paribus less than 90% of the male 
equivalent. Judging from the marginal effects, the gender differences in application probability 
amount to around two percentage points. One needs to bear in mind that the regressions already 
take into account country- and firm-specific characteristics. Consequently, we can rule out these 
factors as the raison d’être of the observed gender differences. Our findings contrast with those in 
Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) who do not find any significant differences in application rates 
across gender in the US, but are in line with the results from Zimbabwe suggesting that it is men 
who are more likely to want loans (Raturi and Swamy, 1999).  
With regard to the control variables, the probability of application increases with firm size. 
Large enterprises have more wide-ranging operations and therefore, at any point in time, will be 
more likely to require bank financing. The variable measuring ‘independence’ bears a positive 
coefficient, highlighting the fact that firms unlinked to groups are freer to use debt finance and 
cannot rely on internal finance provided by the holding company. Expanding enterprises that are 
experiencing turnover growth have greater financing needs, and thus a positive relationship with 
loan application. At the same time, those that are profitable can finance their development from 
retained earnings and are thus less likely to apply. Overall, class age is not a strong determinant in 
the regressions, although older businesses are marginally less willing to borrow possibly due to a 
more consolidated financial position. The results are also consistent with businesses using 
different sources of finance jointly, as evidenced by the positive influence of the financial structure 
variables. 
Among the financial and economic context variables, it is the degree of bank concentration 
that exerts the strongest and most consistent effect on application probability. It reduces the desire 
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of firms to apply for credit, as a lower degree of competition reflects inability to shop around, 
leading to worse contractual terms for the borrower. The directional impact of national 
unemployment depends on whether the regression controls for time invariant country dummies. 
6.2. Rejection Expectations 
In this section we examine whether gender affects managers’ decisions to not apply for a 
loan because of anticipated rejection. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if application 
avoidance was attributed to a self-reported managerial expectation of being turned down and 0 
otherwise. Since the rationale for this approach is to better understand the reason behind non-
submission, we restrict our sample to non-applicant firms only (31,326 observations). Table 4 
reports the estimated parameters and goodness of fit measures for three different specifications. 
Similarly to the previous section, these specifications differ in whether they include country 
dummies as well as the full set of explanatory variables. The good fit is validated by the 2 test for 
joint significance and our models correctly classify around 91% of the observations. The pseudo 
R-squared varies between 4.67% and 6.33%.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Female managers presuppose loan denial more often and self-reject as a result, which is in 
line with our second hypothesis. When evaluating all of the regressions reported in Table 4, one 
can conclude that the odds that a female-led firm will not apply due to an anticipated negative 
outcome are around 12% to 14% higher than the odds for a male comparator. From the point of 
view of marginal effects, the gender difference in likelihood of being discouraged borrower is 
nearly one percentage point. This difference maintains its statistical significance regardless of the 
modeling approach. Extant literature offers only very limited evidence on the link between female 
doubt about future loan approval and the decision to self-exclude. By focusing on US small 
business owners, Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) found no evidence that women, on average, have a 
higher propensity to be discouraged borrowers, even if in markets with high lender concentration 
the female fear of rejection started to manifest and become more prominent. Our estimates 
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obtained for a different geographical region and time period do not seem to be entirely congruous 
with those earlier findings.  
Looking at the estimated coefficients on the control variables, we discover that larger firms 
are more confident in approaching banks. They need more financing and are also aware that due to 
their relative economic soundness and higher degree of diversification, their perceived bankruptcy 
risk is lower. Independent enterprises fear rejection more strongly, as their position in negotiation 
with the lender is weaker and they cannot rely on a holding company for loan guarantees. Since 
profitability is typically one of the screening criteria employed by banks, profitable firms feel less 
concerned about potential negative outcomes. Businesses that are less established and younger 
(less than 9 years old) are aware that they are affected by a higher level of information asymmetry 
and thus exhibit a stronger inclination towards self-exclusion. With the exception of retained 
earnings, the use of alternative sources of finance is significantly and positively associated with the 
dependent variable. Greater use of trade credit or leasing may undermine ability to meet future 
interest and principal repayments and firms seem to be afraid of this eventuality. 
Four more explanatory variables are consistently signed and statistically significant across 
all specifications. First, a banking system that is burdened with bad loans tightens the lending 
standards. In such case, entrepreneurs would encounter more difficulties in obtaining credit and 
some may decide not to apply in order to avoid disappointment. On the other hand, laxer lending 
practices associated with credit expansions alleviate the fear of possible application rejection (note 
that CREDIT_ACCESS takes negative values when banks expand credit). Managers also appear to 
be particularly concerned with the possibility of negative evaluation by a financial intermediary in 
the difficult times of high unemployment. Finally, the coefficients on Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
of bank concentration are significantly negative. It is conceivable that in markets with few large 
banks, lending relationships are more established and informational asymmetries smaller, resulting 
in reduced angst on the part of borrowers. 
6.3. Loan Denials 
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In this section we examine the determinants of rejection in the loan application process. 
Table 5 reports the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 
if the firm has been turned down by a financial institution and 0 otherwise. The sample for this 
analysis is restricted to the enterprises that have actually applied, resulting in a sample size of 
10,647 observations. Similarly to the previous sections, we consider three differing specifications 
in the set of explanatory variables included. The models have reasonable explanatory power and 
correctly classify over 88% of the observations. The 2 test for the joint significance of the 
regressors strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no influence and the McFadden’s pseudo R-
squares vary between 8.02% and 9.31%. These R-squares are slightly lower, but comparable, to 
those reported in Muravyev et al. (2009) for similar regressions estimated using international data.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Even though the coefficients on women manager dummy are positive, we do not find any 
statistically significant evidence of gender-based discrimination and have to reject our third 
hypothesis. The evidence suggests that banks are objective when evaluating requests for credit. 
This finding is not entirely surprising, considering the argument proposed by Becker (1971) that 
engaging in discrimination leads to financial losses to the perpetrator. Although our finding 
supports the earlier results obtained from the US data (Blanchflower et al., 2003; Cavalluzzo and 
Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005), it is incompatible with the conclusions reached 
by Muravyev et al. (2009), who argue that discrimination in the banking sector is present.  
Considering other regressors, we note that firm size exhibits an inverse relationship with 
rejection rates. This nexus can be easily explained, as it has been shown that small businesses have 
a higher probability of bankruptcy (Shumway 2001). Banks also prefer to grant loans to growing 
and profitable enterprises, as these are more likely to honor their future obligations. When 
evaluating the coefficients on age dummies, one needs to bear in mind that firms older than 9 years 
have been taken as a benchmark. All of the younger firm groups face higher rejection rates and, for 
most of them, this finding is statistically significant. Interestingly, the use of leasing and trade 
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credit is associated positively with the likelihood of getting a loan. Presumably lessors and trading 
partners have already evaluated the creditworthiness of the enterprise and deemed it to be 
satisfactory. The analysis performed by banks seems to reconfirm this. Loan denial rates also tend 
to fluctuate with general macroeconomic and financial conditions, decreasing in times of economic 
prosperity, credit expansions and healthy banking system. Big government deficits increase loan 
rejection probability, as banks may choose to lend to the public rather than private sector. Finally, 
there is weak evidence that more concentrated banking systems tend to turn down applications 
more often.  
7. Robustness Checks and Further Considerations 
 In what follows, we examine whether our results are robust to bank concentration, selection 
bias as well as firm’s quality. 
7.1 Bank Concentration and Discrimination 
The first robustness check we perform examines the role of the concentration of the 
banking industry. Becker (1971) argues that, on average, competitive environments are expected to 
discriminate less than monopolistic ones. This happens because prejudicial discrimination is a 
counter-productive activity, since it reduces net incomes of the group that is being discriminated 
against, as well as the group that perpetrates the discrimination. A bank that engages in 
discrimination will have to forfeit a fraction of deals for which the marginal benefit exceeds the 
marginal cost, leading to a reduction in profits. In a highly competitive environment, forfeiting 
income on unproductive activities will prove unaffordable and may quickly lead to the 
perpetrator’s demise. At the same time, banks that face reduced competition could sustain 
discriminatory practices for prolonged periods of time without going bankrupt. Cavalluzzo et al. 
(2002) find empirical evidence that denial rates for female-owned firms in the US depend on 
lender concentration.  
In fact, we have already controlled for bank concentration by considering the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index for the banking sector in a given country. However, in order to gain a clearer 
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understanding of the effect that bank sector concentration has on female-run firms’ credit access, 
we re-estimated the regressions by entering a new variable, namely the interaction of gender with 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index by simultaneously dropping the HHI from the list of control 
variables. In such specifications, the coefficient in front of the gender dummy captures the across-
group differentials that can arise from a variety of sources (namely statistical discrimination and 
prejudicial discrimination) that we expect to be invariant to market structure. The interaction 
variable should capture any gender discrimination that can be ascribed to a lender’s market power 
in the firm’s local area. Wider differentials in less competitive lending markets are consistent with 
taste-based discrimination, as posited by Becker (1971). The results (not reported here) show that 
the interaction variable is not significant, which means that we can rule out any discrimination that 
is driven purely by market concentration.  
7.2 Using Heckman Sample Selection Model 
The second robustness check investigates whether our results are affected by sample 
selection. As explained in the methodology section, we have used different subsamples and 
consequently our results might potentially be affected by sample selection bias. In order to deal 
with this issue, we re-estimated the regressions by relying on Heckman sample selection model 
(Heckman, 1979). We modeled the selection process by relying on a categorical variable that 
measures the firms’ need for additional finance and also acts as our selection equation instrument. 
The results (not reported) were obtained by using a Heckman probit estimation. With regard to our 
models for discouraged borrowers, our main conclusions were maintained and there were no 
changes in the direction of influence of the gender dummy: female managers are more likely to 
self-exclude from the application process due to expected rejection; the gender variable is not 
significant in the loan rejection, suggesting that enterprises managed by women are not 
discriminated by banks. Consequently, our conclusions are robust to selection bias issues. 
7.3 Gender and Firm Creditworthiness 
 It can be argued that the fact that women are more likely to be discouraged borrowers 
Page 24 
could be potentially rooted in the relatively high riskiness of their firms. If they are aware of this, it 
is perfectly rational for them to avoid submitting loan applications because of the expected 
rejection. Unfortunately, the dataset we use in our analysis does not provide detailed information 
on income statement or balance sheet items, which makes it impossible to construct risk measures 
akin to Altman Z-scores (Altman, 1968), that could be used in the regression as additional 
controls. In order to address this potential issue we implement two additional robustness checks. 
Firstly, we replicate the SAFE database by extracting a stratified sample of firms from the 
Bureau van Dijk Dataset – ORBIS. The replicated sample matches the characteristics of the 
original one in terms of firms’ age and turnover classes, distribution across countries and 
industries, and the proportion of women in top management positions. This parallel dataset, 
containing 13,038 observations, is used to examine whether there are significant differences in 
terms of creditworthiness between women- and men-run firms. We rely on the ratios suggested by 
Altman for small enterprises. More specifically, we consider: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(EBIT) / Total Assets; EBIT / Long-Term Loans; and Sales / Total Assets. At the same time, we 
have to drop Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities and (Current Assets − Current Liabilities) / 
Total Assets, because of the lack of data in the ORBIS dataset. We test whether the average values 
of the considered ratios are significantly different between enterprises managed by men and 
women and re-tested the ratios at country level and by firm dimension class. The results we obtain 
are very interesting in that none of the tests indicated any statistically significant differences across 
genders. In other words, the fear of rejection by banks exhibited by female managers should not be 
attributed to the riskiness of their firms.  
Secondly, we try to exploit SAFE dataset by using the general information contained 
therein to construct a crude credit score. To this end, we rely on a set of dimensions, namely a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to a group (an independent firm is higher risk 
than a firm that belongs to a group); the age of the firm (younger firms are more risky since they 
have not established a track record that proves their capability to survive); whether the firm is 
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growing in terms of turnover (growing firms are considered more solid that declining ones); and 
whether the firms are profitable (profitable firms are lower risk than loss making ones). We 
numbered the age classes from 1 (the youngest) to 4 (the oldest) and did the same for the turnover 
classes (1 = smallest; 4= biggest). In the case of change in turnover or change in profit the values 
are 0 (decrease), 1 (no change), 2 (increase). Then we sum these values for each firm obtaining a 
scale that ranges from 0 to 13. 
We then include the credit score as a control in our regressions and simultaneously exclude 
its components from the list of explanatory variables in order to avoid multicollinearity issues 
(interestingly enough, the conclusions remain unaltered even if the components are included). If 
firms led by women are characterized by higher risk, then including our measure could render the 
WOMEN not significant in the discouraged borrowers regression. This however is not the case as 
shown by the results reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8 that reinforce our earlier findings regarding all 
hypotheses tested in our work. 
[TABLES 6, 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE] 
7.4 Additional Tests 
We also run additional econometric robustness checks, but do not report the results here in 
order to conserve space. Firstly, we re-estimate the regressions using the probit approach and find 
that there is no change in the significance and sign of the variables in general and gender in 
particular. Secondly, we also re-estimate coefficient standard errors by employing a bootstrap 
method (Efron and Tibshirani 1998) and again find no major deviations in terms of significance 
from our initial specifications. Thirdly, we included cultural variables into our models (Hofstede, 
1983, 1981). The incorporation of cultural regressors did not change the main conclusions of this 
study. However, our final specifications do not contain these Hofstede’s measures of culture, as 
they are time-invariant and, their inclusion leads to multicollinearity problems. 
7.5 Further Considerations 
Our robustness checks suggest that the original findings are robust to sample selection, the 
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effect of competition, the creditworthiness of the firm as well as different estimation techniques. 
Thus, we can conclude that, in Europe, female-led firms are less likely to apply for a loan 
compared to male-led ones, chiefly because female managers are more inclined to be discouraged 
borrowers.  
Several possible justifications can be offered for these empirical regularities. Firstly, 
female managers could be less confident in their ability to run the business and consequently be 
more conservative when contemplating bank loans. Secondly, they could also have an erroneous 
belief that the financial institutions are biased against them and avoid applying in order to save 
time and avoid distress. Third, we cannot rule out that application propensity could be also linked 
to differential psychological traits such as confidence or emotional reactions to being turned down. 
At the same time, our additional tests on the quality of female run firms undermine the explanation 
that the results could be attributable to gender-linked risk differentials.  
Interestingly, when lender decisions are examined, gender does not affect the probability of 
the loan application being turned down (rejection of H3). Financial intermediaries seem to engage 
neither in statistical nor in prejudicial discrimination. This observation could be the result of 
lenders’ attitudes towards gender-related issues, but it could also derive from the increasing 
adoption of a transaction lending approach, which leverages firms’ facts, figures and the quality of 
management, thereby constraining loan managers’ prejudicial discriminatory behavior. The 
implementation of Basel II and Basel III agreements has promoted the use of transaction lending 
(mainly credit scoring and credit rating techniques), which may have contributed to reducing 
gender bias. Interestingly, transaction lending does not necessarily limit the possibility of 
statistical discrimination, since credit evaluation algorithms used by banks may consider gender. 
However, even if this variable is included in algorithms our findings indicate that it plays a very 
minor role. 
The results reported here cohere with some of the earlier empirical studies, but not with all 
of them. For instance, we find that banks do not discriminate against female entrepreneurs and this 
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is at odds with the work by Bellucci et al. (2010). Some of the previous research, however, can be 
affected by specific local aspects, such as regulation or national culture (e.g. Bellucci et al. (2010) 
focused solely on Italy, while Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) examined only the US). Ours, on 
the other hand, is a multi-country examination, which attempts to control for local context. In 
addition, we use very recent observations that are affected by the implementation of new banking 
regulations - the Basel II and Basel III agreements. As outlined above, these regulations may affect 
the way in which banks operationalize their decision-making, which may affect their attitudes 
towards different groups.  
8. Conclusions 
Our research investigates the role of gender in accessing credit in Europe by exploiting a 
very recent dataset produced by the European Central Bank. The results indicate that female-led 
firms are less likely to apply for a loan compared to enterprises run by men. This happens because 
women managers are reluctant to file a loan application since they anticipate rejection on the part 
of the lender. At the same time, we find no evidence that, in the process of arriving at their final 
lending decision, financial institutions discriminate against firms based on the gender of their 
management. These findings are intriguing, since they indicate that, irrespective of governmental 
regulation and banks’ non-discriminatory policies, enterprises run by females may still end up 
being unnecessarily credit constrained.  
Some of the inferences we make are consistent with part of the existing body of literature - 
for instance, the absence of gender-based bias in loan denial rates was also noted in the US by 
several scholars (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 1998; Cavalluzzo et al. 2002; Blanchflower et al. 
2003). However, they are at variance with Bellucci et al. (2010) and Muravyev et al. (2009) who 
argue that bank discriminatory practices do in fact exist or with Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) who find 
that women, on average, are not more inclined to engage in application avoidance due to the fear 
of rejection. Our results highlight the fact that any overgeneralizations regarding discrimination 
and behavior of female managers can be dangerous and may be potentially misleading. 
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Apparently, conclusions can be dependent upon the dynamic regulatory context or country-
specific factors. 
Our study has several important implications. First, we cannot rule out women self-exclude 
due to their perception that banks will discriminate against their gender. This interpretation implies 
that even if legislators and regulators have addressed prejudicial gender discrimination directly and 
indirectly (as in the case of Basel agreements), they were unable to solve this problem completely. 
Indeed, consolidated opinions, biased evaluations, as well as established cultural frameworks that 
affect gender discrimination are not easy to overcome. Both financial institutions and legislators 
should exert additional effort in order to eliminate any residual and perceived (but absent) 
discrimination. If female application avoidance stems from concern about being discriminated 
against, then the outcome of their behavior will be socially suboptimal since firms can be 
constrained in their growth. Inhibited expansion of firms, in turn, implies foregoing valuable 
employment opportunities.  
A second but related point is that female managers should be careful to ensure that any 
unjustified concerns do not lead to a situation in which their firms become severely credit 
constrained. Low self-confidence in their ability to run the business can adversely affect their 
decision to apply for a loan and consequently reduce the firm’s growth potential. Furthermore, it is 
in the best interest of financial institutions to ensure that women are fully aware of the absence of 
gender bias in their lending decisions. If female self-exclusion is attributable to fear of rejection, 
this will potentially imply missed lending opportunities to creditworthy firms that are capable of 
repaying interest and principal. Through their marketing communications, banks should endeavor 
to alleviate the concerns of female managers in order to stimulate their application propensity. In 
this way, financial intermediaries may be able to access a new untapped segment of the market.  
Our research also has some limitations, which cannot be easily overcome. Firstly, due to 
the fact that SAFE incorporates only limited information on the financial standing of the firms, 
controlling for creditworthiness is a rather difficult task. Even if the results of additional tests 
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involving internal raw credit score and parallel dataset support our findings, we cannot 
categorically rule out the possibility that female self-exclusion is completely unrelated to the 
quality of their companies. Future research based on European data should endeavor to incorporate 
better credit risk measures and further explore the differences between female and male run firms. 
Secondly, we rely solely on European data, which leaves us with the unanswered question of 
whether the conclusions are continent-specific. A third limitation is that, because of the use of 
unmatched panel dataset, we are unable to track the evolution of lending and borrowing decisions 
through time. Notwithstanding the above mentioned limitations, this study expands our 
understanding of how gender interacts with credit supply and demand, as well as identifies areas 
for improvement that could be beneficial for wider society. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents variable definitions and their source. 
Variable Definition Source 
BANK_LOAN_APPLICATION Did the firm applied for a bank loan over the past 6 months (yes=1, no=0) SAFE, ECB 
REJECTION_EXPECTED Did the firm not apply for a loan because of anticipated rejection (yes=1, no=0) SAFE, ECB 
LOAN_REJECTED Was the loan application made by the firm rejected (yes=1, no=0) SAFE, ECB 
WOMEN Gender of the owner/director/CEO of the firm (female=1, man=0) SAFE, ECB 
MICRO Size dummy taking the value of 1 if the company has from 1 to 9 paid employees working over 12 hours a week.  SAFE, ECB 
SMALL Size dummy indicating companies with 10 to 49 paid employees working over 12 hours a week. SAFE, ECB 
MEDIUM Size dummy taking the value of 1 for companies with 50 to 249 paid employees working more than 12 hours weekly. SAFE, ECB 
INDEPENDENT Dummy variable taking a value of 1 for independent firms and 0 for firms that are a part of a group. SAFE, ECB 
CHANGE_TURNOVER Categorical variable dependent on the change in turnover over the last 6 months (increase=1, unchanged = 0, decrease=-1). SAFE, ECB 
CHANGE_PROFIT Change in net income after taxes over the last 6 months (increase=1, unchanged = 0, decrease=-1). SAFE, ECB 
<2YEARS Age dummy (companies younger than 2 years=1, otherwise=0) SAFE, ECB 
2_5YEARS Age dummy (companies between 2 and 5 years old =1, otherwise=0) SAFE, ECB 
5_9YEARS Age dummy (companies older than 5 years, but less than 10 years=1, otherwise=0) SAFE, ECB 
RETAINED_EARNINGS Financing dummy (1 if retained earnings or sale of assets was used in the past 6 months, 0 otherwise) SAFE, ECB 
TRADE_CREDIT Financing dummy (1 if trade credit was used in the past 6 months, 0 otherwise) SAFE, ECB 
LEASING Financing dummy (1 if leasing, hire-purchase or factoring was used in the past 6 months, 0 otherwise) SAFE, ECB 
EQUITY Financing dummy (1 if new equity was used in the past 6 months, 0 otherwise) SAFE, ECB 
GDP_GROWTH Percentage change in the GDP Eurostat 
INFLATION Annual inflation rate Eurostat 
UNEMPLOYMENT Annual unemployment rate Eurostat 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT Government cash surplus/deficit divided by GDP [in percentage points] WDI, 
NON_PERF Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans [in percentage points] WDI 
CREDIT_ACCESS Index representing the propensity of the bank system of a country to lend to borrowers  ECB 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index of bank concentration ECB 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the study. The overall sample and two sub-samples are considered. For exact variable definitions please 
refer to Table 1. Sig.: *** <.01, ** <.05, *<.10 
 
 
Overall dataset Application submitted Application not submitted 
 
for the analysis about credit application 
for the analysis of credit rejection and partial 
rejection for the analysis of rejection expected (self selection) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
BANK_LOAN_APPLICATION 41973 0.254 0.170 0 1   
   
    
   
  
REJECTION_EXPECTED   
   
    
   
  31326 0.086 0.281 0 1 
LOAN_REJECTED           10647  0.118   0.322  0 1           
MICRO 41973 0.331 0.471 0 1 10647  0.237   0.425  0 1 31326 0.363 0.481 0 1 
SMALL 41973 0.338 0.473 0 1 10647  0.342   0.474  0 1 31326 0.337 0.473 0 1 
MEDIUM 41973 0.258 0.438 0 1 10647  0.317   0.466  0 1 31326 0.238 0.426 0 1 
LARGE 41973 0.072 0.259 0 1 10647  0.104   0.305  0 1 31326 0.062 0.241 0 1 
INDEPENDENT 41973 0.758 0.428 0 1 10647  0.784   0.411  0 1 31326 0.749 0.434 0 1 
CHANGE_TURNOVER 41973 -0.008 0.846 -1 1 10647  0.013   0.849  -1 1 31326 -0.016 0.839 -1 1 
CHANGE_PROFIT 41973 -0.157 0.840 -1 1 10647 -0.185   0.843  -1 1 31326 -0.148 0.836 -1 1 
<2YEARS 41973 0.017 0.130 0 1 10647  0.017   0.129  0 1 31326 0.018 0.131 0 1 
2_5YEARS 41973 0.075 0.260 0 1 10647  0.073   0.260  0 1 31326 0.076 0.265 0 1 
5_9YEARS 41973 0.132 0.339 0 1 10647  0.119   0.324  0 1 31326 0.137 0.344 0 1 
>9YEARS 41973 0.778 0.416 0 1 10647  0.801   0.399  0 1 31326 0.770 0.421 0 1 
RETAINED_EARNINGS 41973 0.298 0.457 0 1 10647  0.339   0.474  0 1 31326 0.284 0.451 0 1 
TRADE_CREDIT 41973 0.361 0.480 0 1 10647  0.453   0.498  0 1 31326 0.330 0.470 0 1 
LEASING 41973 0.347 0.476 0 1 10647  0.440   0.496  0 1 31326 0.315 0.465 0 1 
EQUITY 41973 0.067 0.250 0 1 10647  0.082   0.274  0 1 31326 0.062 0.241 0 1 
CREDIT_ACCESS 41973 4.080 9.555 -14.00 60.00 10647  3.491   8.529  -14.00 60.00 31326 4.280 9.872 -14.00 60.00 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT 41973 -5.304 4.522 -29.20 0.14 10647 -5.298   3.905  -29.20 0.14 31326 -5.306 4.713 -29.20 0.14 
NON_PERF 41973 6.075 4.629 0.38 24.99 10647  6.161   4.205  0.38 24.99 31326 6.045 4.764 0.38 24.99 
GDP_GROWTH 41973 -0.078 2.706 -8.50 4.00 10647 -0.276   2.714  -8.50 4.00 31326 -0.011 2.700 -8.50 4.00 
INFLATION 41973 2.118 1.095 -1.70 4.70 10647  2.122   1.091  -1.70 4.70 31326 2.116 1.097 -1.70 4.70 
UNEMPLOYMENT 41973 11.153 5.938 3.60 25.70 10647  11.772   6.023  3.60 25.70 31326 10.943 5.894 3.60 25.70 
HHI 41973 0.091 0.079 0.02 0.37 10647  0.078   0.065  0.02 0.37 31326 0.095 0.082 0.02 0.37 
WOMEN 41973 0.12 0.33 0 1 10647  0.103   0.304  0 1 31326 0.131 0.337 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3: Modelling Loan Application 
This table presents results of three logistics regressions where the dummy for loan application is the dependent variable. The explanatory 
variables are defined in Table1. Sig.: *** <.01, ** <.05, *<.10 
  
Model 1 Loan Application 
 Basic regression 
Model 2 Loan Application  
Regression with country dummies 
Model 3 Loan Application  
Parsimonious model 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects 
MICRO -0.701*** 0.047 0.496 -0.119 -0.659*** 0.048 0.517 -0.111 -0.673*** 0.047 0.51 -0.114 
SMALL -0.368*** 0.045 0.692 -0.065 -0.334*** 0.045 0.716 -0.058 -0.340*** 0.045 0.712 -0.059 
MEDIUM -0.191*** 0.045 0.826 -0.034 -0.170*** 0.045 0.844 -0.030 -0.172*** 0.045 0.842 -0.030 
INDEPENDENT 0.464*** 0.037 1.59 0.079 0.464*** 0.037 1.591 0.078 0.466*** 0.037 1.593 0.078 
CHANGE_TURNOVER 0.112*** 0.017 1.118 0.020 0.107*** 0.017 1.113 0.019 0.106*** 0.017 1.112 0.019 
CHANGE_PROFIT -0.119*** 0.018 0.888 -0.022 -0.107*** 0.018 0.899 -0.019 -0.107*** 0.018 0.899 -0.019 
<2YEARS 0.079 0.092 1.082 0.015 0.054 0.093 1.056 0.010   
  
  
2_5YEARS -0.069 0.048 0.934 -0.012 -0.077 0.048 0.926 -0.014   
  
  
5_9YEARS -0.052 0.036 0.949 -0.009 -0.064* 0.036 0.938 -0.011   
  
  
RETEINED_EARNINGS 0.117*** 0.026 1.125 0.022 0.171*** 0.027 1.186 0.031 0.173*** 0.027 1.188 0.032 
TRADE_CREDIT 0.470*** 0.025 1.599 0.088 0.474*** 0.026 1.607 0.088 0.475*** 0.026 1.608 0.088 
LEASING 0.404*** 0.025 1.498 0.076 0.450*** 0.025 1.568 0.084 0.448*** 0.025 1.565 0.083 
EQUITY 0.213*** 0.045 1.237 0.041 0.257*** 0.045 1.293 0.049 0.256*** 0.045 1.292 0.049 
WAVES Included Included Included 
COUNTRIES   
  
  Included Included 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT -0.001 0.004 1.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.999 -0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.999 -0.000 
NON_PERF -0.018*** 0.004 0.982 -0.003 -0.010 0.012 0.990 -0.002 -0.010 0.012 0.990 -0.002 
CREDIT_ACCESS -0.002 0.001 0.998 -0.001 0.003 0.002 1.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 1.003 0.001 
GDP_GROWTH -0.030*** 0.008 0.971 -0.005 -0.016 0.012 0.984 -0.003 -0.016 0.012 0.985 -0.003 
INFLATION 0.179*** 0.019 1.196 0.033 -0.002 0.024 0.998 -0.001 -0.001 0.024 0.999 -0.001 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.021*** 0.002 1.022 0.004 -0.036*** 0.013 0.964 -0.007 -0.036*** 0.013 0.965 -0.006 
HHI -3.495*** 0.192 0.030 -0.635 -4.157*** 1.589 0.016 -0.747 -4.099*** 1.589 0.017 -0.737 
WOMEN -0.117*** 0.038 0.889 -0.021 -0.110*** 0.038 0.896 -0.019 -0.112*** 0.038 0.894 -0.020 
CONSTANT -1.819*** 0.092 0.162   -0.790*** 0.237 0.454   -0.809*** 0.237 0.445   
             
Observations 41,973       41,973       41,973       
chi2 2520.0 
  
  3013.0 
  
  3008.0 
  
  
p 0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  
R2 0.0530       0.0634       0.0633       
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Table 4: Modeling Discouraged Borrowers 
This table presents three logistics regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy identifying discouraged borrowers. The explanatory variables 
are defined in Table1. Sig.: *** <.01, ** <.05, *<.10 
  
Model 1 Discouraged Borrower  
Basic regression 
Model 2 Discouraged Borrower  
Regression with country dummies 
Model 3 Discouraged Borrower 
Parsimonious model 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects 
MICRO 0.859*** 0.115 2.360 0.068 0.884*** 0.116 2.420 0.065 0.882*** 0.115 2.416 0.064 
SMALL 0.496*** 0.115 1.641 0.037 0.508*** 0.115 1.663 0.037 0.508*** 0.115 1.661 0.035 
MEDIUM 0.249** 0.118 1.283 0.019 0.252** 0.119 1.287 0.017 0.252** 0.119 1.287 0.017 
INDEPENDENT 0.195*** 0.067 1.215 0.013 0.217*** 0.067 1.243 0.014 0.218*** 0.067 1.243 0.013 
CHANGE_TURNOVER 0.016 0.032 1.016 0.001 0.014 0.032 1.015 0.001   
  
  
CHANGE_PROFIT -0.114*** 0.033 0.893 -0.008 -0.124*** 0.033 0.883 -0.008 -0.115*** 0.027 0.892 -0.007 
<2YEARS 0.414*** 0.140 1.513 0.034 0.358** 0.142 1.430 0.027 0.360** 0.142 1.434 0.027 
2_5YEARS 0.531*** 0.068 1.701 0.045 0.477*** 0.069 1.612 0.037 0.479*** 0.069 1.614 0.037 
5_9YEARS 0.240*** 0.057 1.271 0.018 0.224*** 0.058 1.251 0.016 0.225*** 0.058 1.252 0.015 
RETAINED_EARNINGS -0.001 0.048 0.999 0.000 0.036 0.049 1.036 -0.002 0.036 0.049 1.036 -0.002 
TRADE_CREDIT 0.274*** 0.045 1.316 0.020 0.333*** 0.046 1.395 0.023 0.333*** 0.046 1.396 0.023 
LEASING 0.104** 0.047 1.110 0.007 0.105** 0.048 1.110 0.007 0.105** 0.048 1.111 0.007 
EQUITY 0.385*** 0.080 1.469 0.031 0.344*** 0.081 1.411 0.026 0.344*** 0.081 1.411 0.026 
WAVES Included Included Included 
COUNTRIES   
  
  Included Included 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT -0.023*** 0.005 0.977 0.002 -0.010 0.009 0.990 -0.001 -0.010 0.009 0.990 -0.001 
NON_PERF 0.028*** 0.006 1.029 0.002 0.032** 0.016 1.032 0.002 0.032** 0.016 1.032 0.002 
CREDIT_ACCESS 0.009*** 0.002 1.009 0.001 0.009*** 0.003 1.009 0.001 0.009*** 0.003 1.009 0.001 
GDP_GROWTH -0.006 0.012 0.994 -0.001 0.035** 0.018 1.036 0.002 0.035** 0.018 1.036 0.002 
INFLATION -0.045 0.031 0.956 -0.003 0.109*** 0.039 1.115 0.007 0.109*** 0.039 1.115 0.007 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.030*** 0.004 1.031 0.002 0.106*** 0.021 1.112 0.007 0.106*** 0.021 1.112 0.007 
HHI -1.610*** 0.339 0.200 -0.113 -8.791** 3.542 0.001 -0.570 -8.824** 3.541 0.001 -0.572 
WOMEN 0.115** 0.058 1.121 0.008 0.134** 0.058 1.144 0.009 0.134** 0.058 1.143 0.009 
CONSTANT -3.966*** 0.181 0.019   -4.934*** 0.500 0.007   -4.930*** 0.500 0.007   
             
Observations 31,326       31,326       31,326       
chi2 862.1 
  
  1166.0 
  
  1166.0 
  
  
p 0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  
R2 0.0468       0.0633       0.0633       
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Table 5: Modelling Bank Loan Rejection 
This table presents three logistics regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy that defines whether the loan has been rejected (conditional on 
applying). The explanatory are defined in Table 1. Sig.: *** <.01, ** <.05, *<.10  
  
Model 1 Rejected 
Basic Regression 
Model 2 Rejected 
Regression with country dummies 
Model 3 Rejected  
Parsimonious model 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects 
MICRO 1.452*** 0.161 4.272 0.175 1.482*** 0.163 4.403 0.173 1.486*** 0.162 4.419 0.174 
SMALL 0.870*** 0.159 2.386 0.086 0.905*** 0.160 2.473 0.087 0.907*** 0.160 2.478 0.087 
MEDIUM 0.595*** 0.161 1.812 0.057 0.617*** 0.162 1.853 0.057 0.618*** 0.162 1.855 0.057 
INDEPENDENT -0.022 0.122 0.978 -0.002 0.030 0.123 1.031 0.003   
  
  
CHANGE_TURNOVER -0.074* 0.045 0.928 -0.007 -0.058 0.045 0.944 -0.005 -0.058 0.045 0.944 -0.005 
CHANGE_PROFIT -0.090* 0.049 0.914 -0.008 -0.093* 0.050 0.911 -0.008 -0.094* 0.050 0.910 -0.008 
<2YEARS 0.230 0.225 1.258 0.022 0.259 0.228 1.296 0.024 0.253 0.228 1.289 0.024 
2_5YEARS 0.726*** 0.107 2.067 0.082 0.686*** 0.109 1.985 0.074 0.684*** 0.109 1.981 0.073 
5_9YEARS 0.421*** 0.087 1.524 0.042 0.424*** 0.088 1.529 0.041 0.426*** 0.088 1.531 0.041 
RETAINED_EARNINGS 0.0613 0.069 1.063 0.005 0.068 0.070 1.071 0.006 0.068 0.070 1.070 0.006 
TRADE_CREDIT -0.094 0.066 0.910 -0.008 -0.125* 0.067 0.883 -0.010 -0.125* 0.067 0.882 -0.011 
LEASING -0.156** 0.069 0.856 -0.014 -0.171** 0.069 0.843 -0.014 -0.171** 0.069 0.842 -0.014 
EQUITY 0.037 0.124 1.037 0.003 0.090 0.126 1.095 0.008 0.089 0.126 1.093 0.008 
WAVES Included Included Included 
COUNTRIES   
  
  Included Included 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT -0.032*** 0.009 0.968 0.003 -0.036** 0.016 0.965 0.003 -0.039** 0.015 0.962 0.003 
NON_PERF 0.030*** 0.010 1.03 0.003 0.090*** 0.027 1.095 0.008 0.091*** 0.027 1.095 0.008 
CREDIT_ACCESS 0.010** 0.004 1.01 0.001 0.014** 0.006 1.014 0.001 0.014** 0.006 1.014 0.001 
GDP_GROWTH -0.073*** 0.019 0.93 -0.006 -0.106*** 0.030 0.899 -0.009 -0.102*** 0.029 0.903 -0.009 
INFLATION -0.056 0.047 0.946 -0.005 -0.046 0.058 0.955 -0.004   
  
  
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.023*** 0.006 1.023 0.002 -0.017 0.033 0.983 -0.001 -0.008 0.031 0.992 -0.001 
HHI 0.349 0.601 1.417 0.031 -15.860*** 5.590 0.000 -1.334 -15.630*** 5.572 0.000 -1.315 
WOMEN 0.049 0.097 1.050 0.004 0.056 0.097 1.057 0.005 0.056 0.097 1.057 0.005 
CONSTANT -3.795*** 0.287 0.023   -2.329*** 0.751 0.097   -2.612*** 0.635 0.073   
             
Observations 10,647       10,647       10,647       
chi2 619.0 
  
  718.2 
  
  717.5 
  
  
p 0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  
R2 0.0802       0.0931       0.0930       
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Table 6: Modelling Loan Application with Borrower Creditworthiness Index 
This table presents results of three logistics regressions where the dummy for loan application is the dependent. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Sig.: *** 
<.01, ** <.05, *<.10 
  
Model 1 Loan Application  
Basic regression 
Model 2 Loan Application  
Regression with country dummies 
Model 3 Loan Application 
Parsimonious model 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. Odds ratio 
Marginal 
Effects 
RETAINED_EARNINGS 0.094*** 0.027 1.098 0.017 0.148*** 0.027 1.160 0.027 0.148*** 0.027 1.160 0.027 
TRADE_CREDIT 0.498*** 0.025 1.645 0.094 0.500*** 0.025 1.649 0.094 0.500*** 0.025 1.649 0.094 
LEASING 0.472*** 0.024 1.603 0.09 0.514*** 0.025 1.672 0.097 0.514*** 0.025 1.672 0.097 
EQUITY 0.167*** 0.045 1.182 0.032 0.216*** 0.046 1.242 0.041 0.216*** 0.046 1.242 0.041 
WAVES Included Included Included 
COUNTRIES   
  
  Included Included 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT 0.002 0.004 1.002 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.999 -0.001 
   
  
NON_PERF -0.018*** 0.004 0.982 -0.003 -0.015 0.012 0.985 -0.003 -0.016 0.011 0.984 -0.003 
CREDIT_ACCESS -0.001 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.004** 0.002 1.004 0.001 0.004** 0.002 1.004 0.001 
GDP_GROWTH -0.030*** 0.008 0.97 -0.005 -0.013 0.012 0.988 -0.002 -0.013 0.012 0.988 -0.002 
INFLATION 0.183*** 0.019 1.201 0.034 0.001 0.024 1.001 0.001 0.001 0.024 1.000 0.000 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.024*** 0.002 1.024 0.004 -0.033** 0.013 0.967 -0.006 -0.033*** 0.013 0.968 -0.006 
HHI -3.827*** 0.190 0.022 -0.701 -3.576** 1.580 0.028 -0.648 -3.595** 1.570 0.028 -0.651 
WOMEN -0.172*** 0.037 0.842 -0.030 -0.163*** 0.037 0.850 -0.029 -0.163*** 0.037 0.850 -0.029 
SCORE 0.047*** 0.006 1.048 0.009 0.046*** 0.006 1.047 0.008 0.046*** 0.006 1.047 0.008 
CONSTANT -2.068*** 0.08 0.126   -1.055*** 0.231 0.348   -1.047*** 0.216 0.351   
             
Observations 41,973       41,973       41,973       
chi2     2,053.0  
  
  2587.0 
  
  2587.0 
  
  
p 0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  
R2 0.0432       0.0544       0.0544       
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Table 7: Modelling Discouraged Borrowers and Firms Creditworthiness 
This table presents two logistics regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy identifying discouraged borrowers. 
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Sig.: *** <.01, ** <.05, *<.10 
  
Model 1 Discouraged Borrower 
Basic regression 
Model 2 Discouraged Borrower 
Regression with country dummies 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. Odds ratio 
Marginal 
Effects 
RETAINED_EARNINGS 0.135*** 0.050 1.145 0.010 0.176*** 0.050 1.193 0.012 
TRADE_CREDIT 0.257*** 0.045 1.293 0.019 0.316*** 0.046 1.372 0.022 
LEASING 0.036 0.046 1.037 0.003 0.033 0.047 1.034 0.002 
EQUITY 0.537*** 0.080 1.711 0.047 0.497*** 0.082 1.643 0.039 
WAVES Included Included 
COUNTRIES   
  
  Included 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT -0.022*** 0.005 0.978 -0.002 -0.007 0.009 0.993 -0.001 
NON_PERF 0.030*** 0.006 1.030 0.002 0.035** 0.016 1.036 0.002 
CREDIT_ACCESS 0.008*** 0.002 1.008 0.001 0.008** 0.003 1.008 0.001 
GDP_GROWTH -0.008 0.012 0.992 -0.001 0.030* 0.018 1.031 0.002 
INFLATION -0.049 0.031 0.952 -0.004 0.112*** 0.038 1.118 0.007 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.025*** 0.004 1.026 0.002 0.107*** 0.021 1.113 0.007 
HHI -1.444*** 0.337 0.236 -0.102 -10.38*** 3.524 0.000 -0.681 
WOMEN 0.171*** 0.057 1.187 0.013 0.190*** 0.058 1.209 0.013 
SCORE -0.152*** 0.011 0.859 -0.011 -0.158*** 0.011 0.854 -0.010 
CONSTANT -2.320*** 0.146 0.098   -3.169*** 0.484 0.042   
         
Observations 31,326       31,326       
chi2 760.6 
  
  1078.0 
  
  
p 0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  
R2 0.0413       0.0585       
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Table 8: Modelling Bank Loan Rejection and Firms Creditworthiness 
This table presents three logistics regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy that defines whether the loan has 
been rejected (conditional on applying). The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Sig.: *** <.01, ** <.05, *<.10 
  
Model 1 Rejected  
Basic regression 
Model 2 Rejected 
Regression with country dummies 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Std. 
Dev. 
Odds 
ratio 
Marginal 
Effects 
RETAINED_EARNINGS 0.236*** 0.072 1.266 0.022 0.246*** 0.073 1.279 0.022 
TRADE_CREDIT -0.131** 0.066 0.878 -0.012 -0.165** 0.067 0.848 -0.012 
LEASING -0.245*** 0.067 0.783 -0.022 -0.259*** 0.068 0.772 -0.022 
EQUITY 0.241* 0.124 1.272 0.024 0.290** 0.126 1.336 0.028 
WAVES Included Included 
COUNTRIES   
  
  Included 
CASH_SURPL_DEFICIT -0.034*** 0.009 0.967 -0.003 -0.031** 0.016 0.969 -0.003 
NON_PERF 0.031*** 0.010 1.032 0.003 0.090*** 0.027 1.094 0.008 
CREDIT_ACCESS 0.006 0.004 1.006 0.001 0.010* 0.006 1.010 0.001 
GDP_GROWTH -0.072*** 0.019 0.931 -0.007 -0.102*** 0.030 0.903 -0.009 
INFLATION -0.068 0.046 0.934 -0.007 -0.059 0.058 0.943 -0.005 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.017*** 0.006 1.017 0.002 -0.013 0.033 0.987 -0.001 
HHI 0.786 0.589 2.195 0.072 -18.520*** 5.607 0.000 -1.608 
WOMEN 0.134 0.095 1.143 0.013 0.139 0.096 1.149 0.013 
SCORE -0.198*** 0.017 0.82 -0.018 -0.199*** 0.017 0.820 -0.017 
CONSTANT -1.661*** 0.231 0.19   0.168 0.724 1.183   
         
Observations 10,647       10,647       
chi2 488.5 
  
  591.8 
  
  
p 0.0000 
  
  0.0000 
  
  
R2 0.0633       0.0767       
 
